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COMMENTS
PROBLEMS OF STATE JURISDICTION OVER
INDIAN RESERVATIONS
INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this comment is to briefly examine the legal patchwork
of the past in an attempt to understand the emerging present legal status
of the American Indian. Set within the context of the nearly flippant, ad
hoc programs which have periodically characterized the government's In-
dian policy, the courts have generally tried to accommodate fairly-at least
as Americans visualize it-the rights and remedies of the parties. Yet it
may be well to recall that conceptually, justice may seem a double-edged
sword when viewed by a conquered people, especially when the impartial
tribunal is the victor's progeny. We shall first analyze the extent of federal
jurisdiction over Indians in terms of land, persons, property rights and
crimes. Next, we shall investigate state jurisdiction over Indian lands, per-
sons, property rights and crimes. We shall then examine the cession of this
jurisdiction by the federal government to the states. From these insights,
we shall attempt to determine the extent to which state laws are or should
be applicable to Indians on Indian reservations.
GENERAL FEDERAL JURISDICTION
As early as 1790, Congress exercised its constitutional jurisdiction to
regulate trade and commerce with the Indians, by an act which provided,
inter alia, that sales of land by Indians were invalid unless made by treaty.1
Later, in 1817, Congress extended federal jurisdiction over all criminal
offenses committed within Indian country.2 A fundamental exception in
the Act, however, was the exclusion of a criminal offense committed by
one Indian against another-these were left for the Indians to deal with
themselves, explicitly recognizing the inherent jurisdiction existing in the
tribes by reason of their aboriginal origins.
One of the landmark decisions which afforded a delineation of the vary-
ing positions of the United States, the states, and the Indian tribes came
before the Supreme Court in 1831 in the case of Cherokee Nation v. Geor-
gia.8 The Cherokee Nation sought an injunction against the State of
Georgia to restrain it from seizing certain lands guaranteed them by the
I1 Stat. 137 (1790).
2 3 Stat. 383 (1817).
8 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
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United States government in treaties, and to restrain the application of
certain laws passed by the Georgia Legislature. The Court denied the
relief sought holding that the tribes were "domestic dependent nations"
and not foreign nations; therefore, the original jurisdiction 4 of the Court
was lacking and the Nation could not maintain an action in the courts
of the United States. Chief Justice Marshall, who spoke for the Court,
found that the "acts of our government plainly recognize the Cherokee
nation as a state." And although
the Indians are acknowledged to have an unquestionable ... right to the lands
they occupy . . . it may well be doubted, whether those tribes which reside
within the acknowledged boundaries of the United States can.., be denomi-
nated foreign nations .... [T]hey are in a state of pupilage; their relation to
the United States resembles that of a ward to his guardian.5
One year later, however, Chief Justice Marshall was again called upon
to address himself to the problem of federal jurisdiction over the Indians.
Samuel Worcester, a citizen of Vermont and a missionary, entered the
Cherokee Nation to preach the Gospel under license of the Federal
Government. The State of Georgia had by statute forbidden white persons
to reside on the reservation without a license. Worcester was kidnapped
and forcibly removed from the reservation by the Georgia authorities,
indicted, tried, convicted and sentenced to four years at hard labor for
violation of the statute. On writ of error, reversed.6 Describing the status
of the Cherokee Nation, Marshall wrote:
The Cherokee nation.., is a distinct community, occupying its own territory,
with boundaries accurately described, in which the laws of Georgia can have
no force ... The whole intercourse between the United States and this nation,
is, by our constitution and laws, vested in the government of the United States.7
By 1832, largely as a result of these two landmark cases, several key
propositions had emerged: first, that state law had no application on
Indian reservation lands; second, that the posture of the Indian nation
was something more than a state,8 but not that of an independent nation;
4 U.S. CONST. art. III, S 2.
5 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 17 (1831).
6 Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832). However, Rev. Worcester ap-
parently served out his sentence. Pres. Jackson, on learning of Chief Justice Marshall's
decision, was said to have remarked: "John Marshall has made his decision, now let him
enforce it." 20 FED. B.J. 224 (1960).
7 1d. at 561 (Emphasis added).
8 "At no time has the sovereignty of the country been recognised as existing in the
Indians, but they have been always admitted to possess many of the attributes of sov-
ereignty. All the rights which belong to self-government have been recognized as
vested in them. Their right of occupancy has never been questioned, but the fee in the
soil has been considered in the government. This may be called the right to the ultimate
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third, that the relationship epitomized by the phrase "a ward to his guard-
ian" 9 provided a convenient axis around which future judicial edifices
could be built; and fourth, that the Indians, although originally sover-
eign, were now subject to the United States through conquest. All the
tools of the jurist had been employed to forge these concepts.10
The federal government's enhanced jurisdiction and power over the
Indian tribes continued to expand as the country developed westward.
The tribes occupied a somewhat anomalous position. Arguably they oc-
cupied a position superior to that of states, but they had no redress in the
courts of the United States in suits against the United States, either as
individuals or as tribal entities." What one writer has described as the
"treaty period"'12 of Indian affairs finally saw its demise in 1871 by an
addendum to the Indian Appropriations Act of that year which unilaterally
abrogated the treaty power of the Indians as to future treaties, although
no obligation with any Indian Tribe or Nation was impaired or invali-
dated by the legislation." Thus, in the scant space of four decades, Mar-
shall's concept of the Indian tribes as "domestic dependent nations" was
completely eroded.
FEDERAL JURISDICTION OVER LAND
We now turn to examine the concept of Indian title to land. Although
in American history it is prosaically American to believe that the lands
of the United States were purchased from the discovering countries, Felix
Cohen has expressed a contrary view which is realistically nearer the
truth.14 His view is that the United States acquired not the real estate, but
merely the "power to govern and to tax." 5 Cohen traced the underpin-
nings of governmental policy to Article 3 of the Northwest Ordinance
of 1787.16
domain, but the Indians have a present right of possession ... under the constitution,
no state can enter into any treaty .... 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 580-81 (1832) (concurring
opinion).
9 For brief history of the development of this concept, see Oliver, The Legal Status
of American Indian Tribes, 38 ORE. L. REv. 193, 197-98 (1959).
10 U.S. CoNsT. art. I § 8, art. II § 2, art. IV.
11 Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94 (1884) held that Indians are not citizens within the
meaning of the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution. The federal bar to suits by
Indian tribes against the United States in the Court of Claims is to be found in section
9 of the Act of March 3, 1863, 12 Stat. 765, 767 (1863). Both problems were cured later
by Congressional legislation.
12 Flickinger, The American Indian, 20 Fmu. B. J. 212 (1960).
1 16 Stat. 570 (1871); 25 U.S.C. § 71 (1952).
14 Cohen, Original Indian Title, 32 MINN. L. REv. 28, 34-43 (1947).
15 Id. at 35.
16 ".. . The utmost good faith shall always be observed towards the Indians; their
land and their property shall never be taken from them without their consent; and in
their property, rights and liberty, they shall never be invaded or disturbed ..."
COMMENTS
The first significant case in the development of the doctrine of Indian
title was Johnson v. McIntosh,17 wherein it was held that a private indi-
vidual claiming title to land via private purchase from an Indian tribe
could not maintain his title against the United States or its grantees, if the
United States acquired the land from the Indians by treaty. The Indians
would be protected in their title until the government terminated it.
Worcester v. Georgiai8 subsequently declared that a state could not ignore
Indian title. The contention that Indian lands were actually public lands
and subject to whimsical governmental disposition without regard to the
Indians' claims was rejected in Holden v. Joy. 9 Then in United States v.
Shoshone Tribe,20 wherein the Court explored the scope of Indian title,
it was held that it extended not only to cultivation of the land and grazing
uses but also to ownership of the timber and mineral resources thereon.
From this line of authority it could be hypothesized that an Indian claim
to land based merely on immemorial possession of the land would be
sufficient to found a valid claim for compensation in the event the govern-
ment takes the tribal land. The courts have reached contrary conclusions,
however.
The basis on which the Indian tribes may claim compensation for a
taking of their land rests on whether Congress has "recognized" their
title. This recognition is manifested in one of two ways: either by a treaty
or through an Executive order reservation. Executive order reservations
had their origin in 1871, when Congress abolished the treaty power of
the Indians,2x and the President was assigned supervisory responsibility
over the tribes and granted authority to declare Executive order reserva-
tions. By 1919, because most tribal Indians were settled on reservations,
Congress forbade further use of this power.22 But owing to certain unique
problems in Alaska, Indian property rights there required settling at a
later date, and Congress, in 1936, authorized the Secretary of the Interior
to designate certain reservations without any additional statutory ratifi-
cation.23 The Secretary, acting pursuant to this statute established six such
reservations, covering some million and one-half acres of land.24 Questions
as to their title have not as yet been litigated.
17 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1883).
18 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
19 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 211 (1872); "the lands ... were held by the Cherokees under
their original title, acquired by immemorial possession, commencing ages before the
New World was known to civilized man. Unmistakably their title was absolute, subject
only to the pre-emption right of purchase acquired by the United States as the succes-
sors of Great Britain . . ." Id. at 244.
20 304 U.S. 111 (1938). 2241 Stat. 34 (1919), 43 U.S.C. § 150 (1958).
21 Supra note 13. 23 49 Stat. 1250 (1936), 48 U.S.C. § 358a (1958).
24 S. REP. No. 1366, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1948); see H.R. REP. No. 2503, 82d Cong.,
2d Sess. 1386-99 (1952).
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The rule was well established, however, that if the United States govern-
ment had not "recognized"-either through a treaty or an Executive order
reservation-the claim of original Indian title, it could extinguish such
Indian tide at will, without compensation. 25 Moreover, it has been sug-
gested that this recognition must come within the purview of a claim
founded on either legal or equitable rights, to properly fulfill the jurisdic-
tional requirements of the Court of Claims.26 The McIntosh case,27 dis-
cussed above, announced the doctrine that a claim founded on original
Indian title would be treated with respect and fair mindedness. This dogma
found the zenith of its application in United States v. Alcea Band of Tilla-
mooks. 2s In this case the Court, although split three ways, found the United
States liable for the taking of lands held under nothing more than an
unrecognized aboriginal title. Four justices thought recovery should be
based on Congressional action a century before which was not brought
before the Court for adjudication until 1946. Justice Black, concurring,
thought the Indians should be compensated because Congress passed a
jurisdictional act allowing them to bring suit. The suggested requirement
of a "recognized title" was ignored. The important point is, however, that
the decision represents the highest regard for a right asserted by an Indian
Tribe-compensation for a taking of their land.29
Another aspect of the doctrine of federal jurisdiction over Indian lands
can be seen in cases where the federal government attempted to violate
property rights in the tribal lands. In Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, o the
plaintiff sought to enjoin the operation of a Congressional act which
25Northwestern Bands of Shoshone Indians v. United States, 324 U.S. 335 (1945).
What the courts construe as conferring a vested property interest is of note. In the
following treaties the courts uniformly found a compensable property interest: United
States v. Klamath & Moadoc Tribes of Indians, 304 U.S. 119, 123 (1938) (treaty lan-
guage: "held and regarded as an Indian reservation"); Worcester v. Georgia, 21 U.S.
(6 Pet.) 515, 553 (1832) (treaty language: "hunting grounds").
26 The Indian Claims Commission Act of 1946, ch. 959, sec. 24, 60 Stat. 1055 (1946);
28 U.S.C. § 1505 (1958) incorporates the jurisdictional requirements of Act of Nov. 3,
1911, ch. 231, sec. 231, sec. 145, 36 Stat. 1136. The jurisdiction of the Court of Claims
does not include a claim "not recognized by any existing rule of law and equity." For
further development of the subject of Indian property interests see Comment: Tribal
Property Interests in Executive-Order Reservations: A Compensable Indian Right, 69
YALE L.J. 627 (1960).
27 Supra note 17.
28 329 U.S. 40 (1946).
29 The case was again before the Supreme Court in 1951 and the government won a
reversal on the amount of interest. There was no provision in the jurisdictional act,
whence the case arose, for interest, and the Court held that only when a taking entitles
the claimant to "just compensation" under the fifth amendment is an award of interest
proper; and that recovery here was not grounded on a taking under the fifth amend-
ment. 341 U.S. 48, 49 (1951).
30 187 U.S. 553 (1903).
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would have allegedly violated tribal property rights without due process
of law. The United States had agreed by the terms of the Treaty of Medi-
cine Lodges' that all future cessions of tribal lands would be invalid unless
signed by three-fourths of the male members of the Kiowa and Comanche
tribes. The plaintiff alleged that Congress had willfully violated this treaty
provision. The Supreme Court held that Congress had full administrative
control and power over tribal property and that this sale was a valid
exercise of that power. Hence, there was merely a conversion of tribal
assests-that is, land for cash, which converted assests were to be held for
the benefit of the Indians.
The Lone Wolf 32 case can be contrasted with United States v. Klamath
Indians.8" By the terms of a treaty of 1870,34 the Klamath Indians ceded
twenty million acres of land to the United States, reserving the remainder.
The government then conveyed one hundred eleven thousand acres of land
held by tribal allottees to the State of Oregon which subsequently assigned
the lands to a road construction company. Congress then authorized the
Secretary of the Interior85 to exchange unalloted lands for the allotted
lands. The value of the timber resources on these assigned lands was
$2,980,000, but the tribe had accepted $108,750 in payment and released
their claims. This release was held valid in Klamath Indians v. United
States.36 By a special act in 193687 Congress granted jurisdiction to the
Court of Claims to hear this disputed Indian claim for compensation. The
Supreme Court held that Congress, by opening the door, agreed to grant
the Indians the right to have their claim for compensation judicially de-
termined, without regard to the earlier settlement and irrespective of the
release.
Title to restricted tribal land cannot be acquired through a claim of
adverse possession. 38 Moreover, where the United States granted certain
lands to the defendant's assignor, but never extinguished Indian title to
the land, the Court has held such a defendant to be liable for rents and
profits from whatever lands could be proven to have been occupied by
the tribe from time immemorial.39
Another case which graphically demonstrates the extent of federal
jurisdiction over Indian lands is United States v. Forness.40 The Seneca
81 15 Stat. 581 (1867). 33304 U.S. 119 (1938).
32 Supra note 30. 34 16 Stat. 707 (1870).
35 Act of June 21, 1906, 34 Stat. 325 (1906).
36 296 U.S. 244 (1935).
3749 Stat. 1276 (1936).
38 United States v. 7405.3 Acres of Land, 97 F. 2d 417 (4th Cir. 1938).
39 United States v. Santa Fe Pac. R. R., 314 U.S. 339 (1941).
40 125 F. 2d 928 (2d Cir. 1942).
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Nation of Indians granted a ninety-nine year lease to certain lands within
the City of Salamanca, for a consideration of $4 per year. The lessee had
been in default for nine years before the United States, on behalf of the
Indians, sought to cancel the lease. The defense interposed was that, in
effect, it was an action of ejectment and was therefore barred by a New
York statute providing that upon tender of the rent in arrears before
judgment, the court shall dismiss the complaint. The district court denied
relief, but the Court of Appeals reversed. Thus, the court dispelled any
notions that juristiction as between the State of New York and the United
States over the lands in question might be concurrent,41 and held that state
law does not apply to Indian land except as far as the United States has
given its consent.
Within this conceptual framework-that the United States, as guard-
ian, will stand up to defend its Indian wards, the recent case of Tee-Hit-
Ton Indians v. United States42 must be assessed. Here, petitioners sued in
the Court of Claims contending that a sale of all the merchantable timber
on lands claimed by the petitioner was a compensable taking of a portion
of its proprietary interest in land. The petitioners' claim rested on abo-
riginal occupation, a claim which the Russian government had recog-
nized prior to the conveyance of Alaska to the United States by treaty,48
and fortified by Congressional enactments44 subsequent to this treaty
which have recognized the petitioners' right to occupy the land. The
Court of Appeals held that although the petitioners were an identifiable
group of American Indians residing in Alaska, Congress had recognized
no legal rights in the petitioner to the lands in dispute and that, therefore,
no grounds were afforded on which the tribe could claim that its land had
been taken. Regrettably for the Indians, the Supreme Court agreed and
affirmed. This decision has been thoroughly criticized from both moral
and legal viewpoints.4 5
The question arises as to whether the Tee-Hit-Ton decision sounds the
death knell to Indian claims in the absence of any Congressional recogni-
tion of Indian title. At least one writer has answered affirmatively, 46 but
notes that Congress has supplied the "missing link" in the Tee-Hit-Ton
41 For discussion of the legal situation in New York which afforded a basis for belief
that jurisdiction might be concurrent, see Gunther, Governmental Power and New
York Indian Lands-A Reassessment of a Persistent Problem of Federal-State Relations,
8 BUFFALO L. Rv. 1 (1958).
42348 U.S. 272 (1955). 43 15 Star. 539 (1867).
44 Organic Act of Alaska, Act of May 17, 1884, 23 Stat. 24; Act of June 6, 1900, 31
Stat. 321, 330 (1900).
45 The Supreme Court, 1954 Term, 69 HAuv. L. REv. 119, 150 (1955).
46 Oliver, The Legal Status of American Indians, 38 ORE. L. REv. 193 (1959). Acts
which constitute recognition of an interest in land may be either: (1) treaty ratification;
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case by subsequently conferring general jurisdiction on the Indian Claims
Commission.4
7
FEDERAL JURISDICTION OVER PERSONS
The question of the extent of federal jurisdiction over individual Indians
next arises. Although it might seem that the first Americans would be
citizens, such was not always the case. As recently as 1916, the case of
Elk v. Wilkins48 held that tribal Indians were not citizens within the
meaning of the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution. And even
though a Sioux Indian had been naturalized and granted federal and state
citizenship, it was held in United States v. Nice49 that he still had a ward-
ship status and that therefore, as a consequence, the sale of his interest in
lands held in trust by the federal government was invalid. In 1924, how-
ever, Congress provided that henceforth Indians were citizens. 50 Other
questions surrounding the exertion of control by federal authorities have
arisen but for the most part remain unlitigated. Federal interference with
Indian voting rights, patent federal interference with the "free exercise of
religion" by Indians-this despite such nice pronouncements as the Vitale
case 51-and occurrences where Indian funds belonging to the Oglala Sioux
were impounded after tribesmen criticized wasteful government spending
are fully documented elsewhere 52 and are essentially beyond the scope of
this comment.
FEDERAL JURISDICTION OVER PROPERTY RIGHTS
We shall now briefly examine federal jurisdiction over Indian property
rights in such matters as fishing, sealing and water.53 In Alaska Pacific
(2) indirect Congressional delegation to the Executive who then possesses power to vest
Indian property interest, e.g., Congressional acquiescence plus a Congressional under-
standing that Executive establishment of an Indian reservation vests rights in the In-
dians; or (3) statutory recognition of tribal property interests in a reservation defined
by Executive order and in esse at the passage of the statute, and Tribal property in-
terests would become compensable at the passage of the statute. Sioux Tribe of Indians
v. United States, 316 U.S. 317 (1942) and United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236
U.S. 459 (1915) represent examples of the second category above. Contra is Ute Indians
v. United States, 330 U.S. 169 (1947) which held lands withdrawn by the President
from the public domain as new reservations are not vested in the tribes to the extent of
requiring compensation if the government later takes them back.
4760 Star. 1050 (1946), 25 U.S.C. 5 70a (1958).
48 112 U.S. 94 (1884). 49 241 U.S. 591 (1916).
5043 Star. 253 (1924); 8 U.S.C. S 3 (1958).
51 Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
52 Cohen, The Erosion of Indian Rights 19SO-1953: A Case Study in Bureaucracy, 62
YALE L. J. 348, 353-59 (1954).
53 See case in note 20 supra, and accompanying text wherein the Supreme Court held
that a title to land would support subsurface and surface rights, as well as farming and
grazing uses.
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Fisheries v. United States,54 the United States, on behalf of the Metlakatla
Indians, sued to enjoin the defendant cannery from maintaining a fish trap
in the navigable waters adjacent to the Annette Islands, a statutory reserva-
tion.55 The Court "upheld the right of the Metlakatlans to exclude others
from the waters surrounding their islands on the ground that these waters
were included within the original reservation by Congress." 56 Protection,
therefore, is apparently allied to the concept of a recognized reservation
or other claim of right. It is, however, subject at the other extremity to
state police power since the decision in Aleut Community of St. Paul
Island v. United States57 indicated that even where Indians had enjoyed
exclusive sealing rights under the Russian czars, and had occupied reserva-
tions lands, 58 the Indians became subject to the government's paramount
power to control the taking of seals when the United States purchased
Alaska. Similarly, by way of dictum the Supreme Court has indicated that
withdrawal by the United States of exclusive fishing rights conferred on
a tribe would create no liability in favor of Indians against the government,
unless the tribe had a "recognized" claim of title to their lands.59
The desires of the Indian tribes, then, seem sometimes at odds with those
of their guardian-the United States. To the extent their reservations lands
remain unrecognized by the government and as to sporadic applications of
the police power, this is true. But the federal authorities have not hesi-
tated to sue or intervene in suits wherein other parties might jeopardize
or infringe on Indian rights. The best example of this can be found in the
Supreme Court's disposition, last term, of the case of Arizona v. Califor-
nia.60 There, the government on behalf of five Indian reservations in three
states asserted rights to water in the mainstream of the Colorado River.
Arizona argued that the United States had no power to reserve navigable
waters of the river after Arizona became a state; that the United States
did not intend to reserve water; and that the amount of water should be
measured by the reasonably forseeable needs of the Indians living on the
reservation. Justice Black, who wrote for the Court, relied on the Win-
ters"' doctrine and rejected all three contentions:
54 248 U.S. 78 (1918).
55 26 Stat. 1095, 1101 (1891), 48 U.S.C. § 358 (1958).
56 Medakada Indians v. Egan, 369 U.S. 45, 49 (1962).
57 117 F. Supp. 427 (Ct. C1. 1954).
58 Act of March 3, 1869, 15 Stat. 348 (1869).
59 Hynes v. Grimes Packing Co., 337 U.S. 86 (1949).
60 373 U.S. 546, 83 S. Ct. 1468 (1963).
61 Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908) holding that Indians impliedly re-
served sufficient waters to make their reservation lands tillable, useful and livable de-
spite their failure to expressly reserve these waters.
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[T]hese reservations . . . were not limited to land, but included waters as well.
. . . We follow [Winters] now and agree that the United States did reserve the
water rights for the Indians effective as of the time the Indian Reservations
were created. This means . . . that these water rights . . . are "present per-
fected rights" . . .62
The majority also concluded that the quantity of water intended to be
reserved was intended to satisfy not only present, but also future needs of
the Indians. Thus although the application of the Winters doctrine has
been seriously questioned as applied in the Western states,63 the Court
vigorously asserted a protective shield between the Indians and conflicting
state interests.
FEDERAL CRIMINAL JURISDICTION
As early as 1817, Congress extended federal criminal jurisdiction over
all Indian lands for all offenses, except those committed by one Indian
against another. 64 Since this act excluded crimes by Indians against Indians
and since the Worcester65 case excluded the application of state law, the
only law which could apply was Indian law. Three decisions in 1883
caused an awakening of public opinion as to the unfortunate state of the
law and resulted in the inclusion, in the Indian Appropriations Act of
1885,66 of federal criminal jurisdiction over seven major crimes when
perpetrated by one Indian against another: murder, manslaughter, rape,
assault with intent to kill, arson, burglary and larceny. The most signifi-
cant of these three opinions was Ex Parte Crow Dog.67 Crow Dog, a
Sioux, shot and killed Spotted Tail for having appropriated the wife of
his friend, Medicine Bear. According to tribal custom Crow Dog's friends
made amends to Spotted Tail's family and the matter was then closed.
But interloping federal authorities arrested, tried and convicted Crow Dog
of murder. He then sought and was granted a writ of habeas corpus on
the grounds that the federal court lacked jurisdiction because the right
of prosecution lay exclusively within the Sioux tribal courts.
62 Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 598-600; 83 S. Ct. 1468, 1497-98 (1963).
63 Sondheim & Alexander, Federal Indian Water Rights: A Retrogression to Quasi-
Riparianism?, 34 So. CAL. L. REV. 1 (1960).
64 3 Stat. 383 (1817).
65 Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832); and see Benge, Law and Order
on Indian Reservations, 20 FED. B. J. 223, 223-24 (1960).
66 23 Star. 385 (1885). In 1932, Congress added three more crimes: assault with a
deadly weapon, robbery and incest. 47 Stat. 337 (1932); codified in 18 U.S.C. § 1153
(1952). In 1956, embezzlement or theft from tribal funds was added: 70 Star. 792
(1956); 18 U.S.C. § 1163 (Supp. IV 1957).
67 109 U.S. 556 (1883). The other two decisions were State v. McKenney, 18 Nev.
182, 2 Pac. 171 (1883) and an opinion of the Attorney General reported in 17 Ops.
ATT'Y GEN. 171 (1883).
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Although not the law today, because of the Federal Assimilative
Crimes Act,68 the Court strictly construed the enactment of the Seven
Major Crimes Act."9 Illustrative of this policy of strict construction is the
case of United States v. Quiver70 in which an indictment charging the
defendant with adultery was dismissed on the ground that the Seven
Major Crimes Act left everything within tribal jurisdiction except the
crimes specified in the Act.
There was some doubt as to whether the Seven Major Crimes Act gave
the federal courts exclusive or concurrent jurisdiction. Such doubt was
quickly resolved in practice, however, because the effect of its application
was to give the federal authorities exclusive jurisdiction. The case of
United States v. Whaley 7' affirmed the manslaughter conviction against
four tribal executioners who imposed the death sentence pursuant to an
order of the tribal court. But if two courts would attempt a prosecution
of the same offense, a plea of double jeopardy in the second would effec-
tively bar its prosecution. 72
By about 1930, dicta statements indicated that state laws would apply
to Indian reservation lands, but not state jurisdiction. Thus, in Surplus
Trading Co. v. Cook,73 the Supreme Court in dictum said that a reserva-
tion is a part of the state wherein it is located and that state civil and
criminal laws have the same force and effect therein as elsewhere within
the state, except that these laws have restricted application to Indian
wards. Eight years later, Mr. Justice Black in United States v. McGowan74
discussed the same point and stated that a federal prohibition against, for
example, taking intoxicants into a reservation did not negative Nevada's
sovereignty over the area; that the federal government did not assert
exclusive jurisdiction within it and that only federal enactments designed
to protect and guard its Indian wards affect the operation of conflicting
state laws.
In certain cases, Indians became subject to state law, but not state juris-
diction, if: 1) Congress remains silent; or, 2) there was no tribal ban on
the matter; and 3) if the victim was not a tribesman. For example, in
United States v. Sosseur,75 the defendant was indicted for maintaining
slot machines on his reservation, which Wisconsin law declared to be ille-
68 54 Star. 234 (1940), 18 U.S.C. S 289 (1949).
69 23 Stat. 385 (1885). 70 241 U.S. 602 (1916).
7137 Fed. 145 (Cir. Ct. S. D. Cal. 1888).
72 United States v. La Plant, 156 F. Supp. 660 (D. Mont. 1957).
73 281 U.S. 647 (1930).
74 302 U.S. 535, 539 (1938) and citing Surplus Trading Co. v. Cook, supra note 73 and
Hallowell v. United States, 221 U.S. 317 (1911).
75 181 F. 2d 873 (7th Cir. 1950).
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gal. The defendant's conviction was affirmed on the basis that nontribes-
men had used the machines and that the offense, therefore, was not solely
against another Indian. The Assimilative Crimes Act 76 made Wisconsin
law applicable.
As to jurisdiction over whites and/or non-tribal Indians on reservations,
the law applicable to places within the sole and exclusive jurisdiction of
the United States extends to Indian country 77 and the federal govern-
ment has jurisdiction to prosecute such persons even if the offense is
committed on property which is also within state jurisdiction. Illustrative
of this is Guith v. United States78 wherein the defendant, a white rancher,
raped an Indian girl on his ranch, which, although situated within the
reservation boundaries, had been acquired by a tax deed from the local
county without any express reservation of federal jurisdiction. An analo-
gous case 79 further illustrates the effect of the Assimilative Crimes Act.
Petitioner, a white man, had been convicted in a federal district court of
having had sexual intercourse on an Indian reservation in Arizona with
an unmarried Indian girl under eighteen, but over sixteen. The Supreme
Court held that the Assimilative Crimes Act8 would not render Arizona
law applicable, under which the defendant would have committed rape,8"
the penalty for which was imprisonment for not less than five years and
up to life. Instead, the Court held that because Congress defined the act
as that of adultery, the penalty for which, incidentally, was imprisonment
for not more than three years,8 2 this crime could not be considered to be
redefined by application of the Assimilative Crimes Act.83 Mr. Oliver
summarizes the present state of the law as follows:
As the law now stands, (1) major crimes by one tribesman against another on
a reservation are under exclusive Federal jurisdiction, and minor crimes are
under exclusive tribal jurisdiction; (2) crimes by a tribesman against a non-
tribesman are under exclusive Federal jurisdiction if the offense is committed
on the reservation, is an offense proscribed in places within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the United States, or is an offense in the state where the reser-
vation is located. However, if the tribesman has already been punished by his
tribe or if a treaty reserves exclusive jurisdiction in the tribe, neither Federal
nor state courts have jurisdiction in situation (2).84
76 54 Stat. 234 (1940), 18 U.S.C. § 289 (1949). The converse of the proposition is not
always true, however. See infra, note 79 and accompanying text.
77 The term Indian country was defined for the first time in Act of June 30, 1834,
4 Star. 729, and redefined in 62 Stat. 757 (1948), as amended 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (1949).
78 230 F. 2d 481 (9th Cir. 1956).
7 9 Williams v. United States, 327 U.S. 711 (1946).
80 54 Stat. 234 (1940), 18 U.S.C. § 289 (1949).
81 ARiz. CODE SEc. 43-4901 (1939).
82 35 Stat. 1149 (1909), 18 U.S.C. § 516 (1949). 83 Supra note 80.
84 Oliver, op. cit. supra note 46 at 224 (1960) (Footnotes omitted).
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STATE JURISDICTION OVER INDIANS
Although state jurisdiction was in the early years of the United States
almost nonexistent,8 5 this proposition was not universally true8s and be-
came less so as years passed. We shall now examine such jurisdiction in
terms of land, persons, property rights and crimes.
STATE JURISDICTION OVER LAND
In the early history of the State of New York, the state authorities
believed the state could exercise almost exclusive jurisdiction without any
federal consent.8 7 Indeed, they apparently drew such inferences from the
case of New York ex rel. Cutler v. Dibble"" wherein the Supreme Court
held that the State of New York could apply its law to remove intruders
from Tonawanda Indian lands. Converse to this application, however, was
the earlier case of Fellows v. Blacksmith.8 9 There, the Supreme Court had
held that land claimants had no right to remove the Tonawanda Indians
from lands surrendered by the Treaty of 1842,90 because the removal of
Indians from their ancient possessions "must be by the authority of the
federal government" 91 and "under its care and superintendence. '9 2
In 1840, the New York legislature authorized the sale of Indian lands
which the Seneca Indians had agreed to remove from, after the Indians
had defaulted on tax payments. The Supreme Court voided these laws and
the taxes, holding that the rights of the Indians did not depend on this or
any other statute of the state, but upon treaties, which were the supreme
law of the land.93 Also, the case of United States v. Boylan94 is significant.
The United States sued to eject one Boylan, on behalf of the Oneida Indi-
ans. Boylan's defense was that his purchase of land was authorized under
New York law. It was held that only if Congress authorized disposal of
the land could Boylan get good title. Even where Congress stands mute,
the state cannot regulate the sale of reservation lands and state courts
85 Worcester v. Ga., 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
86 See, e.g., Gunther, Governmental Power and New York Indian Lands-A Reassess-
ment of a Persistent Problem of Federal-State Relations, 8 BUFFALO L. REV. 1 (1958).
871d. pp. 11-13. 8862 U.S. (21 How.) 366 (1858).
8960 U.S. (19 How.) 366 (1856).
90 Act of Jan. 15, 1838, 7 Stat. 550 (1838).
91 Fellows v. Blacksmith, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 366, 370-71 (1856).
92 Ibid.
93 The New York Indians, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 761 (1866). And see The Kansas Indians,
72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 737 (1866) wherein it was held that Indians "enjoy the privilege of
total immunity from state taxation." Id. at 756.
94 265 Fed. 165 (2d Cir. 1920), appeal dismissed 257 U.S. 614 (1921).
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cannot render effective judgments against them. Thus, the state can act
to protect reservation Indians within its borders, but cannot take, sell or
effectively render judgments against their lands absent Indian and federal
consent; Congress could be said to impliedly consent if the legislature's
act is beneficial to the Indians.
STATE JURISDICTION OVER PERSONS
The states have historically been at a loss to exercise jurisdiction over
Indians on federal reservations. Thus, Martinez v. Southern Ute Tribe95
held that a federal court cannot, through a mandamus order, compel a
tribe to accept the petitioner as a member. Since the federal court is de-
ficient in this respect it would be strange indeed if the state courts could
do so and it has expressly been held that they cannot.90 Earlier than the
Patterson97 case the courts refused to assume jurisdiction to litigate in-
ternal questions relating solely to Indian rights to tribal property.98 Where
one state court did grant an injunction prohibiting a Tribal Council from
enforcing its tribal laws on the reservation, the injunction was held in-
valid. 99 Even when a non-Indian asserted that state law was available to
him to prevent the Indians from cancelling property leases for defaults in
rental payments, the Court of Appeals held that the state law did not
bind the Indians. 00 A late state case recognized that its state courts had
no jurisdiction to litigate claims for personal injuries arising out of an
automobile accident on an Indian reservation in which only Indian claim-
ants were involved. 01 Any claim for relief had to be asserted in the tribal
court-the state was without jurisdiction over the parties.
Attempts by the states to exercise the traditional power to tax against
Indians have met with dubious success. The early case of Childers v.
Beaver102 involved the application of an Oklahoma statute to a Federal
Act which provided that when an Indian allottee died before the trust
period over his estate had expired, succession to his estate was to follow
state law. The Supreme Court held that the effect of the state statute was
a mere expression of Congressional will and that the statute was ineffective
95 249 F. 2d 915 (10th Cir. 1957).
96 Matter of Patterson v. Council of the Seneca Nation, 245 N.Y. 433, 157 N. E. 734
(1927).
97 Ibid.
98 United States v. Seneca Nation, 274 Fed. 946 (W. D. N. Y. 1921). For the extent of
this doctrine's application, see Rice v. Maybee, 2 F. Supp. 669, 672 (W. D. N. Y. 1933).
99 United States v. Charles, 23 F. Supp. 346 (W. D. N.Y. 1938).
100 United States v. Forness, 125 F. 2d 928 (2d Cir. 1942).
101 Valdez v. Johnson, 68 N. Mex. 476, 362 P. 2d 1004 (1961).
102 270 U.S. 555 (1926).
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as to inheritance tax provisions. Indians are, of course, subject to federal
income tax, but the Supreme Court has suggested, via dicta, that income
received from the United States as a share of royalties from oil and gas
leases subject to federal tax would probably not be subject to state income
taxes absent Congressional consent.103
STATE JURISDICTION OVER PROPERTY RIGHTS
The question which arises here is highly relevant from the standpoint
of jurisdiction. It becomes important when a tribe cedes lands to the
United States reserving perpetual hunting and fishing rights, and subse-
quently, the United States includes the lands within the boundaries of a
state or territory. The legal question is whether the state's police power
can be used to, in effect, abrogate the federal treaty guarantees. To some
extent, this discussion overlaps the discussion below of state criminal
jurisdiction, since violations of state hunting and fishing laws are, in many
cases misdemeanors.
The Supreme Court faced this very problem in the case of Ward v.
Race Horse.10 4 A treaty' 5 with the Bannock Tribe gave the Indians
virtually perpetual hunting rights on their reservation lands. The Wyo-
ming Organic Act' 00 admitted the State of Wyoming into the Union on
the same status as the original thirteen states and it contained no saving
clause of tribal hunting rights under prior treaties. Race Horse was ar-
rested for killing elk on unoccupied public lands within the boundaries of
Wyoming, but belonging to the United States. His petition for a writ of
habeas corpus was denied. The reason was that although the Wyoming
Territorial Act 10 7 expressly reserved tribal hunting rights, there was no
such clause in the Statehood Act and the Supreme Court held the prior
treaty provision was thereby abrogated. Effectively the same case arose
before the Supreme Court of Idaho in 1953.108 The Indian, a Nez Perce,
had killed a deer outside the reservation on lands ceded to the United
States. Idaho's Territorial Act'09 saved tribal hunting rights but the State-
hood Act 10 did not. In an enlightened opinion, the Supreme Court of
Idaho reached a result contrary to that of the United States Supreme
Court in Race Horse. The court pointed out that neither within its State-
103 Choteau v. Burnet, 283 U.S. 691 (1931).
104 163 U.S. 504 (1896).
105 15 Stat. 674 (1869).
106 26 Star. 222 (1890).
107 15 Stat. 178 (1868).
108 State v. Arthur, 74 Ida. 251, 261 P. 2d 135, cert. denied, 347 U.S. 937 (1954).
109 Act of March 3, 1863, 12 Star. 808 (1863). 110 26 Stat. 215 (1890).
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hood Act nor in its constitution was there an expressed intention to ex-
tinguish any treaty rights or obligations and that "repeal of such provisions
by implication is not to be favored.""'
In 1942, a Yakima tribesman was convicted of violating a Washington
conservation law which prohibited the unlicensed catching of salmon. The
tribe had by treaty 12 reserved the right to take fish "at all times and
places." 18 The Supreme Court held that the State of Washington could
not charge the Yakima tribe a fee as a condition to the exercise of their
treaty rights.114 In a dictum, however, it intimated that the state could
impose on all persons reasonable conservation regulations. Fifteen years
later, the Washington Supreme Court was still in doubt over the matter.
Puyalup tribesmen were charged with violating state laws for catching
salmon. The charges were dropped and the State Supreme Court af-
firmed,"" but the court was divided as to the reason. Half the court
thought the applicable treaty language"16 granted to virtually everyone the
right to fish with the Indians and that the Indians had reserved their fishing
rights unless the United States government abrogated them. The other half
of the court thought the state failed to show the law was reasonably
applied.
Where the Indians conduct their activities within the confines of their
reservations, it appears the law is settled to the effect that state law has
no application to the activity. In Klamath and Modoc Tribes v. Maison"'1
it was argued that the terms of Public Law 280,118 which extended state
jurisdiction over certain reservations, included a jurisdictional extension of
state fish and game laws over tribal domains as well. The district court
held that such was not Congressional intention and that no treaty was
abrogated by the extension of jurisdiction where the treaty in question
specifically reserved to the tribe the exclusive right to take fish on its
reservation.119
The State of Alaska recently tried to enforce a state law banning the
use of "fish traps" against the Metlakatla Indians. The contention was that
the Statehood Act 120 transferred control of all fishing to the state. The
11 74 Ida. 257, 261 P. 2d at 138.
112 12 Stat. 953 (1859).
118 Ibid.
114Tulee v. Washington, 315 U.S. 681 (1942).
115 State v. Satiacum, 50 Wash. 2d 513, 315 P. 2d 400 (1957).
116 10 Stat. 1133 (1855) (Treaty language: "in common with all citizens of the terri-
tory.").
"1 139 F. Supp. 634 (D. Ore. 1956).
118 68 Stat. 795 (1954), 18 U.S.C. 5 1162 (Supp. IV 1957).
119 Supra note 117. 120 72 Stat. 339 (1958).
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Indians argued that the statute121 which granted to Alaska civil and crimi-
nal jurisdiction over Indian reservations expressly preserved Indian reser-
vation fishing rights from state laws. 12 2 Justice Frankfurter, writing for
the Court, held that the reservation was Indian property within the State-
hood Act, and that this statute "clearly preserves federal authority over the
reservation.' 23 Thus, if the Secretary of the Interior chose to do so, he
could provide for the use of the fish traps by the Indians.
STATE JURISDICTION OVER CRIME
The original line of authority in this area was influenced considerably
by Marshall's leading opinions in the Cherokee Nation124 and Worces-
ter'25 cases. Since state law had no application on Indian reservations,
federal law applied if Congress had so provided, as it did, for example,
with the passage of the Seven Major Crimes Act.126 Tribal law applied
wherever there was no Congressional enactment. However, we have al-
ready noted that the enactment of the Federal Assimilative Crimes Act1 27
brought state law-though not state jurisdiction-into operation wherever
federal law was silent. Moreover, periodically the Supreme Court would
assert, through dicta, that state laws did apply on Indian reservations ex-
cept to the extent that federal laws had been enacted to the contrary.128
One early leading case, while this issue was still in doubt, was that of
State v. Campbell.129 There, Campbell, a nontribal white, committed
adultery with Belonge, a tribal Indian, on the reservation. The trial court
convicted both defendants. The Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed Camp-
bell's conviction but reversed and remanded with directions to dismiss the
other defendant. The reason was that the State of Minnesota had no juris-
diction over this defendant. The Campbell case refused to follow an ear-
lier decision by the Wisconsin Supreme Court. In that case,130 the defend-
ant, an Oneida Indian, committed adultery on the reservation with a
nontribal married woman. The Wisconsin Supreme Court unequivocally
12172 Stat. 545 (1958).
122 A reservation for these Indians was provided by Congress: 26 Stat. 1095, 1101
(1891), 48 U.S.C. § 358 (1952).
123 Metlakatla Indians v. Egan, 369 U.S. 45, 59 (1963).
124 Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
125 Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
126 23 Stat. 385 (1885).
127 54 Stat. 234 (1940), 18 U.S.C. § 289 (1949).
128 Surplus Trading Co. v. Cook, 281 U.S. 647 (1930); Hallowell v. United States,
221 U.S. 317 (1911); United States v. Sosseur, 181 F. 2d 873 (7th Cir. 1950).
129 53 Minn. 354, 55 N.W. 553 (1893).
130 State v. Dextater, 47 Wis. 278, 2 N.W. 439 (1879).
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held that the criminal laws of the state did apply to Indians on their res-
ervations and that the state circuit court had jurisdiction over the reser-
vation territory. If the act was committed off the reservation, the states
had no trouble in deciding that jurisdiction was predicated on the locus
of the act, and the wardship status of the defendant was no bar to prose-
cution. A representative case is State v. Youpee, 3' where the conviction
of the defendant, a tribal Indian, for raping a tribeswoman off the reser-
vation, was affirmed by the Montana Supreme Court on the above-
mentioned grounds.
FEDERAL CESSION OF CIVIL AND CRIMINAL JURISDICTION
Although some writers have characterized the history of the American
Indian into as many as five or six separate eras, 132 it will suffice for our
purposes here to discuss only four. The first was the treaty period which
lasted until 1871, at which time Congress unilaterally denied the treaty
power of the Indians by passage of the Indian Appropriations Act 33 of
that year. The second period began with the passage of the General Al-
lotment or Dawes Act'34 in 1887. During this era the Indians were dealt
with as individuals-assimilation into American society was the concept,
whether the Indians liked it or not. The act provided that tribal lands
could be broken up into individual plots and the individuals' title would
be free and clear at the expiration of a twenty-five year trust period.
Tribal land holdings shrank during this period from 155,632,212 acres in
1881 to a scant 52,651,393 acres in 1933-all largely due to the beneficent
operation of the General Allotment Act.13 5 Owing to dissatisfaction with
Indian policy and other upheavals, the Congressional disposition shifted
sharply in 1933. This resulted in enactment of the Wheeler-Howard Act
or the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934.136 Tribal participation in this
program was voluntary, but to quote Mr. Oliver, "195 out of the 272
tribes in the United States accepted it.'u 37 The motive of the I.R.A. was
to reunite the tribes into a virile community. The Act reversed the allot-
ment policy by imposing an indefinite period of trusteeship and, among
other things, provided machinery by which local self-governing groups
could be organized.
131 103 Mont. 86, 61 P. 2d 832 (1936).
132 Flickinger, The American Indian, 20 FED. B. J. 212 (1960).
133 16 Star. 570 (1871); 25 U.S.C. § 71 (1952).
134 Act of Feb. 8, 1887, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (codified in miscellaneous portions of
25 U.S.C. 1952).
135 Oliver, The Legal Status of American Indian Tribes, 38 ORE. L. REV. 193, 202
(1959), citing COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 78 (4th printing 1945).
136 Act of June 18, 1934, 48 Stat. 984 (1934), 25 U.S.C. § 1461-75 (1952).
137 OLIVER, supra note 135, at 202.
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The fourth period of Indian affairs began with Congressional adoption
of House Concurrent Resolution 108 in 1953.188 The resolution embraced
all the tribes in California, Florida and New York, the Flathead Tribe in
Montana, the Klamath Tribe in Oregon, all Texas tribes and the Menomi-
nees in Wisconsin, and some other tribes. 189 The concept of this resolution
was that various Indian tribes should be released from federal supervision
and control-whether the Indians liked it or not, since there was no con-
sultation with the tribes. The proposal encountered strong advocates as
well as opponents. Apparently, some members of Congress felt that it was
time for the government to extricate itself from Indian affairs. 40
Other groups bitterly opposed and criticized these plans. For exam-
ple, Sol Tax, noted anthropologist, characterized both the Menominee
and Klamath terminations as "disasters."'1 41 The Association on American
Indian Affairs also opposed the resolution. 142 Mr. LaFarge, noted expert
on Indians, summarized the opposition thus:
Intermittently for some 75 years proponents of disintegration have applied
their theories by various processes ending tribal ownership of property and
encouraging the break-up of solid blocks of Indian land into fragments ac-
companied by measures to weaken or destroy tribal governments, frustrate
Indian leadership, and in the past either to cut young Indians off from their
cultures and languages or to instil in them contempt for their elders and their
tradition. The similarity of these procedures to those of communism is startling,
and, as with Communists, we have enforced them for the people's "own
good." We did not, however, make the subjects over into white men, mental-
ly, morally, or physically; what we did was nearly to destroy the Indian
economic base, reduce tens of thousands to landless beggary, and prepared the
desolate mess that many now want to sweep under the rug by means of
"termination."14
Apparently, the opposition to this law was based on long-standing fears
by the Indians of mistreatment at the hands of the states. Justice Miller,
writing in Kagama v. United States,144 articulated the ideal well, "Because
of the local ill feeling, the people of the States, where they are found, are
often their deadliest enemies."' 145 Moreover, it will be recalled that the
188 99 CoNG. REc. 6283 (1953).
13 99 CONG. REC. 9968 (1953).
140 Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Indian Affairs of the House Committee on
Interior and Insular Affairs, 83 Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 7 (1953). See for example the re-
marks of Representative Saylor at p. 4.
141 Letter to Representative O'Hara from Sol Tax, reprinted in 103 CONG. RaE. 9020
(Daily ed., June 21, 1957).
142 See 23 Indian Affairs Newsletter 3 (1957).
148 La Farge, Termination of Federal Supervision: Disintegration and the American
Indians, 311 ANNALS 41, 42 (1957).
144 118 U.S. 375 (1886). 145 Id. at 383.
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Elk case held that Indians were not citizens despite the apparent command
of the fourteenth amendment. 146 Professor Gunther has also discussed
these fears.147 In the face of the plans to turn the Indians over to the states,
it appears anomalous that there is still some doubt as to whether reserva-
tion Indians enjoy state citizenship. 148 Despite, however, the fears and
opposition of the Indian groups, at least nine such acts have been passed,'149
the effect of which has been to transfer jurisdiction, civil and criminal,
over all matters committed on the reservations to the states. Moreover,
Congress has provided in the same basic law that any state may take over
Indian affairs at its pleasure.
To view the effect of this Congressional action, we need to examine the
case of Williams v. Lee.1o Here the operator of a general store on the
Navajo Indian Reservation sued in an Arizona state court to collect for
goods sold on account. Defendants, a Navajo Indian and his wife, moved
to dismiss on the ground that exclusive jurisdiction lay in the tribal court.
The Arizona Superior Court denied this motion and judgment was en-
tered for the store operator. The Arizona Supreme Court affirmed. 151 On
appeal to the Supreme Court, reversed. No jurisdiction existed in the Ari-
zona courts because Arizona had not exercised the privilege of assuming
control over the Indians. Moreover, allowing the state to undermine
tribal courts would palliate the Indians' right to govern themselves. The
Court said that since Congress had recognized the right of the Indians to
govern themselves, the Court would guard the authority of the Indian
government. The New Mexico court applied this rule in Valdez v. John-
son 52 where it was held that it had no jurisdiction over an automobile
accident occurring on an Indian reservation involving only Indian parties.
We now consider two recent Supreme Court cases. 5' Both arise on
similar facts from the State of Alaska, which had, in 1958, assumed civil
and criminal jurisdiction over all Indian country within the state." 4
Alaska's economy depends to a large extent on salmon fishing. For many
146Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94 (1884).
147 GruNmr, op. cit. supra note 24, at 26.
148 Suggested in unpublished paper on file in DePaul University Law School Library.
149 18 U.S.C. S 1162, 28 U.S.C. § 1360 granting such civil and criminal jurisdiction to
California, Minnesota, Nebraska, Oklahoma, Oregon, Texas, Utah, Wisconsin, Alaska:
72 Stat. 545 (1956).
150 358 U.S. 217 (1959).
15183 Ariz. 241, 319 P.2d 998 (1958).
15268 N. Mex. 476, 362 P.2d 1004 (1959).
188 Kake Village v. Egan, 369 U.S. 60 (1962); Metlakada Indians v. Egan, 369 U.S. 45
(1962).
15472 Stat. 545 (1958).
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years, Congress and the Territorial government were concerned over
salmon conservation. A particularly menacing object which became the
focus for governmental attention was the "fish trap," a device which traps
the salmon on their way upstream. The Metlakatla Indians, occupying the
Annette Islands, a statutory reservation, 15 5 were allowed to use "fish
traps" by the Secretary of the Interior,156 and President Wilson by proc-
lamation set aside the waters within 3,000 feet of certain of the Annette
Islands as a part of the Metlakatla reserve.157 Then in 1959, after Alaska
had become a state, she warned the Metlakatlans and others that she would
enforce her anti-trap law' 5s against them. This threat, when acted upon
by the state, resulted in the instant litigation in which the Indians sought
to enjoin this law as an interference with their federal rights. The district
court and the Alaska Supreme Court found against the Indians, 159 and
from this adverse judgment the Indians appealed.
The Court examined the statute under which the state was granted civil
and criminal jurisdiction over Indian lands and noted that one section
thereof specifically prohibited the state from regulating or depriving any
Indian or Indian tribe of "any right, privilege or immunity afforded under
Federal treaty, agreement or statute with respect to hunting, trapping or
fishing or the control, licensing, or regulation thereof."'160 The Metlakatla
Indians derived their right to fish from an 1891 statute under regulations
of the Secretary of the Interior. 161 Alaska argued that under the State-
hood Act1 62 control of all fishing was transferred to the state. But the
Court denied this contention, holding that the statute transferring civil
and criminal jurisdiction to the state "clearly preserves federal authority
over the reservation.' 163 Thus, the determination of whether the Indians
needed the fish traps, as opposed to legitimate conservation measures by
the state, was for the Secretary of the Interior to make.
Unfortunately for the Tlingit Indians residing at Kake Village, they
did not fare as well. 6  This was the companion case to the Metlakatla
case. This community's entire economy was based on salmon fishing.
Here, however, there was neither an Executive order nor a statutory reser-
15526 Stat. 1095 (1891), 25 U.S.C. § 358 (1952).
15625 C.F.R. ch. 1 (1958).
157 39 Stat. 1777 (1916).
158 ALASKA LAWS 1959, c.17.
159 362 P.2d 901 (Alaska 1961).
160 18 U.S.C. §§ 1162-66 (1958).
16126 Stat. 1101 (1891), 48 U.S.C. § 358 (1958).
16272 Stat. 339 (1958).
16 369 U.S. 59 (Emphasis added).
164 Kake Village v. Egan, 369 U.S. 60 (1962).
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vation involved. Basing his actions on the White Act' 65 and the Alaska
Statehood Act,166 the Secretary of the Interior issued regulations167 au-
thorizing this village to use certain fish traps. But the Court distinguished
this case on the fact that Congress had provided these Indians with no
reservation and decided that there was no statutory authority under
which the Secretary could validly permit use of the fish traps.168 The
Court said the White Act merely gave the Secretary powers to limit fish-
ing and that the Statehood Act "did not give powers of the nature claimed
by the Secretary of the Interior."' 69
The Court carefully considered section 4 of the Alaska Statehood Act
wherein the state disclaimed, and the United States retained absolute
jurisdiction over lands and property including fishing rights; and decided
that the section's purpose was to preserve the status quo as to aboriginal
and possessory claims, neither extinguishing them nor making them com-
pensable. Moreover it held that "appellants' claims are property (includ-
ing fishing rights) within section 4."170
Having so held, the next question was whether Alaska could apply her
police power to those rights. The Court noted that the same language as
used in section 4 had been used in nine prior Statehood Acts. Then it
applied the criterion of the Williams case, 171 that state law could have no
effect on the reservation because it would impinge on tribal self-govern-
ment,172 and analogized another case 17 to arrive at the conclusion that
"absolute" federal jurisdiction did not equate with "exclusive" jurisdic-
tion. It then held that section 4 did not exclude application of state con-
servation laws to the Indians' fish traps. 174 The Court comprehensively
reviewed the development of state power over. Indians and stated:
These decisions indicate that even on reservations state laws may be applied
to Indians unless such application would interfere with reservation self-govern-
ment or impair a right granted or reserved by federal law .... State authority
over Indians is yet more extensive over activities, such as in this case, not on
any reservation .... This Court has never held that States lack power to regu-
165 43 Stat. 464 (1924), as amended 48 U.S.C. §§ 221-28 (1958).
166 72 Stat. 339.
167 24 Fed. Reg. 2053, 2069.
168 369 U.S. at 62.
169 Id. at 63.
170 Id. at 67.
171 Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959). See note 150, supra and accompanying text.
172 Note, however, the absence of any reservation in the instant case-the case deals
with an "aboriginal right."
173 Draper v. United States, 164 U.S. 240 (1896).
174 369 U.S. 60, 68 (1962).
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late the exercise of aboriginal Indian rights, such as claimed here, or of those
based on occupancy.' 75
Summarily, the Court decided that although these Indians had a "right,"
the state could, by exercise of its police power, completely emasculate
that right and render it a nullity. And since this "right" would probably
not be compensable, 176 it must be small satisfaction to the Tlingits to
know they have a "right," the exercise of which vitally effects their en-
tire economy and which a United States statute would seem to preserve,
yet which is for them, unenforceable.
Here, ostensibly due to the transfer of civil and criminal jurisdiction to
the State of Alaska, the practice of the Tlingits in the use of fish traps,
undisturbed by the federal government, was suddenly illegalized by ap-
plication of state law. No mean application either, but state action striking
at the heart of the Indian community's economy. Despite Justice Frank-
furter's reliance on the Williams case, 177 it seems inapplicable precedent
because, first, in that case there was no state action, one of the parties, the
non-Indian, sought relief in a state court, and his remedy was held to lie
in the tribal court, but he had a remedy. Secondly, the State of Arizona
had not exercised, nor had Congress granted, civil and criminal jurisdic-
tion over those tribes.
Apparently, one can see some distinction in comparing the Metlakatla
and Kake Village cases. In the first, the State was impotent to enforce its
anti-fish trap law in the domain of a statutory Indian reservation; in the
second, that impotency was cured due to an absence of any "right" de-
rived from federal law. And yet in the last term, the Court vigorously
protected Indian water rights, by application of the Winters doctrine,
again where federally recognized reservations were involved. 178
CONCLUSION
The purpose of this analysis has been to derive some basis for deter-
mining the extent to which state laws are applicable on Indian reserva-
tions. Early in this nation's history, the Supreme Court spoke in terms of
"ward and guardian," as to the Indians. At the core of those terms lies the
principle of fiduciary responsibility. From those early cases can be derived
the tool which the Court, if it is so inclined, can use to cloak the Indians
from deleterious state action. It is the rankest form of legal hocus pocus
when by the mere cession of civil and criminal jurisdiction to a state,
175 Id. at 75-76.
170 See text and discussion supra note 46 discussing under what circumstances the
courts will grant compensation for a taking of Indian rights.
17 7 Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959).
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without the consent of the Indians, their rights are emasculated and their
economies wrecked, whereas before the statute's enactment they peace-
fully pursued their own paths.
Neither the Supreme Court nor Congress has been at a loss in the past
to effectively allow the state to apply laws which would serve the best
interests of the Indians. Through a Congressional enactment,179 the states
were allowed to enforce their sanitation and quarantine laws, make in-
spections for health and educational purposes, and enforce compulsory
school attendance. The Court has taken pains to note that state law applies
on Indian reservations except where Congress has spoken to the con-
trary.18 0 Thus, it would seem to be the rule that after a cession of civil
and criminal jurisdiction to a state, all state laws would apply on the res-
ervation except where a federal treaty or claim founded on federal law
may be asserted to the contrary. To these two exceptions should be added
a third, namely, where a practice is sanctioned or acquiesced in under the
federal jurisdiction so that the Indian tribe involved may be said to have
acquired an equitable right, the mere cession of jurisdiction should not
operate to the tribe's disadvantage-that which was legal before the trans-
fer should remain protected under residuary federal guardianship.
Arguably, when Congress fails to speak, it can be interpreted as a man-
ner of speaking. Failure to express disapproval may be interpreted as ap-
proval. Where an Indian community acts, relies and sustains detriment,
the equitable principle of estoppel is a handy sword to slay the dragon of
paternalistic state laws which could not operate but for a jurisdictional
cession. For the government to try to get out of the "Indian business" may
be praiseworthy. It will be sad indeed if, to effect this laudable objective,
it abandons the racial group it, as well as this country collectively, has
treated most shabbily. Continuation of these spineless withdrawals will
only further sully the shabby linen.
The record is not totally replete with failure yet. It is arguable that
where an Indian reservation is concerned, or a claim can be traced to fed-
eral law, the courts will vigorously protect those rights from deleterious
state legislation while at the same time taking due cognizance of state law.
One would hope that the conceptual basis of the Metlakatla case could be
extended to cases where the asserted right might be more tenuous than
one founded on a treaty or federal law. The Tlingit Indians present an
appealing case for application of an estoppel principle. This is not founded
on the basis of their race alone. It is founded on the fact that they acted
for years on what was arguably an implied promise, namely, federal ac-
17945 Stat. 1185 (1929), as amended 25 U.S.C. § 231 (1958).
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